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The European Union’s Strategy for 
a New Partnership with Central Asia 
is approaching its fourth year of 
implementation.1  In that time the EU has 
placed its relationship with Central Asia 
on a more structured footing through 
the establishment of several formal 
initiatives designed to support seven 
engagement priorities in the region.2 
The EU Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) has allocated €321 
million to support the Strategy between 
2011 and 2013.3 Direct contacts 
between European officials and political 
leaders from the region, conducted in 
both Europe and Central Asia, are at 
unprecedented levels. Although progress 
has been made in building dialogue 
and in furthering engagement in certain 
defined areas, the limitations of the 
strategy are increasingly obvious. The 
Joint (Commission and Council) Progress 
Report (JPR)4 on the implementation of 
the EU Strategy for Central Asia, released 
in June 2010, acknowledged that 
improvements are necessary, although 
clear action or solutions are not proposed.
1 The European Union and Central Asia. Strategy 
for a New Partnership’, European Council 
(Brussels, June 2007), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
central_asia/docs/2010_strategy_eu_centralasia_
en.pdf
2 Human rights, the rule of law, good governance 
and democratisation; youth and education; 
economic development, trade and investment; 
strengthening energy and transport links; 
environmental sustainability and water; combating 
common threats and challenges; and inter-cultural 
dialogue.
3 Central Asia DCI Indicative Programme 
(2011-2013). http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/
docs/2010_ca_mtr_en.pdf
4 Joint Progress Report on the implementation of 
the EU Strategy for Central Asia (Brussels, 28 June 
2010), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/
st11/st11402.en10.pdf#page=2
The core of the problem is a (possibly 
understandable) deficit within the EU in 
defining and articulating its interests in the 
region. The EU has not visibly integrated, 
or even reconciled, its various agendas: 
normative (human rights, good governance, 
cultural dialogue), technical (education, 
environment, economic development) and 
interest-based (energy, security). As the 
unfolding events in the Middle East have 
vividly illustrated, reliance on inherently 
undemocratic elites to deliver security-
focused pillars of the relationship can 
potentially undermine both the credibility 
and delivery of the normative elements 
of the EU’s agenda. Compounding this 
dilemma is the lack of visibility and impact 
of the Strategy and the tangible lack of 
progress in building regional cooperation. 
Many of the leaders in the region have 
a history of hostile personal relations, 
and the region’s economies, although in 
many respects interdependent, are not 
geared to cooperation either in terms 
of resource usage or broader economic 
development. Moreover, there is clear 
scope for improvement in developing both 
internal EU coordination and engagement 
with other international donors and critical 
European and regional stakeholders.
To its credit, the JPR is objective and 
transparent in recognising these deficits, 
but overplays the importance of the 
human rights dialogues where tangible 
progress at ‘ground level’ has been 
negligible. The JPR identified specific 
areas for reinforced engagement: human 
rights; rule of law and democracy; 
security; water and energy; and security 
cooperation over Afghanistan. However, 
there are few defined and measurable 
objectives in delivering progress and the 
JPR stops short of:
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• firstly, fundamentally re-evaluating whether the seven priorities 
are sustainable; 
• secondly, evaluating the likelihood of available resources 
realistically matching  the strategy’s objectives; and 
• thirdly, addressing the EU’s limited leverage on, and interest in, 
Central Asia’s most urgent security challenges. 
This brief argues that the driving force of the EU engagement 
with Central Asia should be based on a closer link between 
security and development. Engagement in this broad field 
should be underpinned by a values based approach that seeks 
to promote reform on human rights, rule of law, governance and 
democracy more explicitly. 
The momentous changes sweeping across the Middle East and 
North Africa have demonstrated that even the most apparently 
durable authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to sudden political 
shocks. The instability seen in Kyrgyzstan during 2010, 
although stemming from a combination of very country-specific 
vulnerabilities, illustrates that Central Asia is not immune 
to violent political change. The EU has to be careful, in US 
President Barack Obama’s words, not to be “on the wrong side 
of history”. In all of the Central Asian states, sudden leadership 
change is likely to create a political vacuum within which ethnic, 
regional and economic grievances could arise in unpredictable 
ways.
Three challenges        
So, where does the EU go in the next (2011-13) phase of 
its Strategy? At present, the Strategy suffers from three 
shortcomings that must be remedied if the EU is to effectively 
define its ‘key interests, means and constraints in the quickly 
evolving regional context as well as ensuing priorities and 
expectations’.5  
First, for all the Strategy’s many priorities and interests, it 
is, as noted, only backed by €321 million in the period 2011-
2013.6  This is approximately €20 million per country per year, a 
modest amount compared to assistance received by countries 
in Europe’s neighbourhood. We do not argue that Central Asia 
has a higher priority than other regions and should receive more 
funding but we do argue that the current list of priorities is too 
broad and that funding is spread over too many areas of interest 
to have a sustainable impact. In short, tough choices need to 
be made about where the EU directs its resources. Meanwhile 
there is still a chance that committed funding will be redirected 
to other regions which would send the wrong signal to Central 
Asia and affect the EU’s reputation as it would be regarded as 
fire fighting instead of committing to structural assistance.
We argue here for increased project funding linking security to 
development. This is a broad field since security and development 
can mean almost anything. However, linked together, and taking 
good governance, rule of law, democracy and human rights into 
5 Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia.
6 This amount is provided through the DCI. A roughly equal amount is 
provided through several other European funding mechanisms such as 
EIDHR or the Instrument for stability; by European financial institutions 
(EIB and EBRD) and through national funding by EU member states. For 
an overview of the allocation of the €719 million see: European Community 
Regional Strategy Paper for assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–
13, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf 
account, it would be possible for the EU to increasingly devote 
attention to Security Sector Reform (SSR) which is an area 
that comprises all institutions and actors involved on security 
matters; from military to police and from the ministries to the 
parliament and civil society groupings. Of course Central Asian 
regimes leave little room to engage on all facets of SSR but 
there might be room for working on good governance initiatives 
that link to police reform or (less sensitive) disaster response 
mechanisms. The EU should also use its limited leverage to 
address more sensitive topics in the security and governance 
fields with Central Asian leaderships. The little and ad hoc SSR 
project funding that does exist in Central Asia mostly comes from 
European governments which is insufficient. A coordinated EU 
approach that goes beyond SSR and selects and discusses a 
portfolio of projects with Central Asia’s republics might actually 
have an impact and help clarify Europe’s role of stability and 
security in Central Asia.
Second, the EU is divided over its approach to the authoritarian 
regimes and leaders of Central Asia. Human rights dialogues 
have increasingly become separated from other policy 
discussions with Central Asia. The EU seems, for instance, to 
be more flexible towards Turkmenistan whose gas reserves 
may be critical to the feasibility of Southern Corridor energy 
transit projects. The question is not only about a choice between 
energy and values but goes deeper into Brussels’ dealings with 
the region. 
The EU’s approach to Uzbekistan is an instructive case. EU 
sanctions, imposed following the violent suppression of an 
uprising in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan in May 2005, were 
lifted in October 2009. However, virtually no substantive reforms 
have taken place in the field of human rights, good governance, 
rule of law and democratisation. Meanwhile, relations between 
Tashkent and Brussels have not improved nor has there been 
a substantial growth in trade and energy ties. In January 2011, 
President Islam Karimov visited Brussels to meet with EU and 
NATO officials but the Belgian authorities, the EU and NATO 
all denied having sent the invitation which deeply divided the 
EU. Karimov initially flew in to London but was pointedly not 
received by any UK government official. EU Commission 
President Barroso welcomed Karimov while Council President 
Van Rompuy categorically refused to meet with him. 
Ultimately, the visit of Karimov, which was poorly managed, 
reinforced the reality that EU-Uzbekistan relations remain 
insubstantial with little immediate prospect of further 
improvement. It is logical to conclude that Karimov’s presence 
in Brussels could be interpreted as recognition for Uzbekistan’s 
logistical cooperation in NATO’s Afghanistan campaign. It 
demonstrated  that member states are deeply divided over 
their engagement with the Uzbek government, that within EU 
structures there are also divergent views between Commission 
and Council and that, ultimately, NATO’s security imperatives in 
Afghanistan, however viewed, have shaped engagement with 
Uzbekistan. This is underscored by the noticeably high profile 
accorded to security cooperation over Afghanistan in the 2010 
JPR. 
Third, while the underlying rationale of the Strategy is increasingly 
geared towards security the EU can expect little from this unless 
it formulates more clearly what objectives it hopes to achieve 
and how to achieve them. Most EU activities in the security 
field are indirect, focusing on governance projects and through 
engagement with Central Asian leaders and sometimes with 
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civil society or officials on a local level. The Border Management 
Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) is the only direct security-
related work that is financed by the EU (though implemented by 
the UN Development Programme). 
The violent episodes in Kyrgyzstan between April and June 
2010 showed that the EU has neither the mechanisms to act if 
necessary nor the will to become directly involved in complex 
regional emergencies. However, this also applies to China, the US 
and regional security organisations such as Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), while Russia probably had 
the means to quickly intervene but also chose to show restraint. 
Next to national and regional security dilemmas and threats there 
is the war in Afghanistan where the EU hopes that Central Asian 
states go beyond allowing NATO to ship supplies through its 
territories. It is however unclear what Central Asian states could 
contribute; if they are willing and capable to contribute; and how 
the EU can support the countries in making them into genuine 
partners concerning Afghanistan.
The EU’s core task should be to sort out its priorities for the 
region and the region’s own priority issues and try to bind them 
more systematically, and also direct resources to areas where 
the impact will be greatest for both parties. Good governance 
in the security sector might be taken up as one of the priorities; 
discussing change with the Central Asian leaderships but also 
through a bottom-up approach in working with local authorities 
and civil societies (however limited their presence might be) in 
addressing issues such as reform of the police, prisons, disaster 
preparedness mechanisms and possible extension of the BOMCA 
programme. The EU Initiative on Rule of Law – coordinated by 
France and Germany – could serve as one of the frameworks 
in which Europe addresses security-development issues in a 
values-based approach. This regional initiative is gaining interest 
from additional EU members – for instance through financial 
support from Finland – hopefully to be followed by others. A 
primary task is to work for the interests of Central Asians, where 
they are detached from those of the region’s leaders, and this will 
mean identifying the EU’s potential for leverage and a willingness 
to use it if appropriate.
Taking up regional security
Central Asia faces a host of security challenges that include 
drug trafficking, human trafficking, organised crime and 
terrorism, in addition to the external ‘overspill’ threat posed by 
instability in Afghanistan and possible military action against 
Iran. The region also has specific intra-regional threats, notably 
inter-state conflict potential between upstream and downstream 
states arising from diversion of scarce water resources for 
power generation and irrigation purposes. At the national level, 
the poorest Central Asian republics face the threat of instability 
due to a combination of deficient governance, endemic official 
corruption, and downward pressure on household incomes, 
exacerbated by higher food prices and falling remittances 
following the onset of the global financial crisis.7   While the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 is the culmination of region-specific 
drivers, many of the underlying structural causes are replicated 
in Central Asia.
7 On the impact of rising food prices, see ‘Central Asian regimes brace for 
impact of global food crisis‘, Sayara Ma-Shan-Lo, AFP, 19 February 2011.
Tangible progress in the area of regional cooperation has been 
in short supply and there are three reasons for this failure. First, 
the EU’s aspirations are so broad-ranging and general that they 
work against the focused pursuit of achievable and measurable 
objectives. Second, the demands of NATO’s campaign in 
Afghanistan have served to effectively de-link the security and 
governance agendas, demonstrated above in the disorganised 
handling of President Karimov’s visit to Brussels. Third, there is 
an absence of coordinated will on the EU’s part to understand 
and engage with the complex realities of Central Asia’s security 
deficits, most obviously in the initiatives designed to counter 
narco-trafficking described below. 
Much of the activity undertaken so far under the Strategy, 
from political dialogue to assistance programmes, forms 
part of the security ‘basket’. The French and Swedish EU 
presidencies organised high-level security conferences in 
2008 and 2009 while EU Special Representative Pierre Morel 
regularly discusses security issues with the region’s leaders. 
On an operational level, the EU has two projects – the Border 
Management programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) and the 
Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) – both of which 
predate the Strategy. The Central Asia Regional Information and 
Coordination Centre (CARICC), which has been established to 
combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics and their sources, is 
also supported by the EU. 
BOMCA involves practical capacity building to develop border 
management strategies, including training of border guards 
and infrastructural improvements, particularly along the 
porous Tajik-Afghan border where narco-trafficking represents 
a significant ‘soft’ security threat. However, there is credible 
evidence of direct involvement by leading state officials in the 
narco-trafficking trade, including members of the family and 
government of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev.8 
Persistent allegations continue to be made that high-ranking 
Tajik officials are also implicated in smuggling.9  Interestingly, 
President Imomali Rahmon’s 23 year old son, Rustami Imomali, 
was appointed to head the anti-drug trafficking department of 
the Customs Committee in March 2011.10  There is thus a real 
risk that the EU’s narcotics control efforts are being channelled 
by Central Asian government officials to eliminate rivals rather 
than the problem itself. In this instance, the integration of the 
human security dimension, most obviously in the promotion of 
good governance and the rule of law, with the broader security 
agenda has not been satisfactorily developed.
So, how does the EU untangle these dilemmas? First, security 
in Central Asia is an issue around which the interests of all 
EU member states converge. This is rare in the area of EU 
external relations and represents an important start. Second, 
there are external threats, notably in Afghanistan, where the 
interests of the EU and Central Asia undoubtedly converge. 
In this, the EU must recognise that the leverage is not all one 
8 For the involvement of Bakiyev’s circle in narco-trafficking see ’The 
Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan’, International Crisis Group Report No. 193, 23 
August 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/
kyrgyzstan/193-the-pogroms-in-kyrgyzstan.aspx
9 The case of  official collusion in narco-trafficking by senior officials in 
Tajikistan’s government is covered in Letizia Paoli, Irina Rabkov, Victoria A. 
Greenfield and Peter Reuter: ‘Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State’, Journal 
of Drug Issues, 37 (4), 2007, pp.951-980.
10 “The President promotes his son to new customs post”, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 17 March 2011.
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way. It is arguably even less in the interests of Uzbekistan for 
Afghanistan to be controlled by the Taliban than it is for EU 
member-states. The EU should not, therefore, seek to ‘reward’ 
Uzbekistan for security cooperation with NATO-led forces in 
Afghanistan by going easy on human rights issues. Without 
Coalition assistance, Uzbekistan would be on the front line. 
President Karimov knows this and has very few alternatives 
to working with NATO. As a consequence, there is perhaps 
more opportunity than is acknowledged to approach security 
cooperation in a broader sense with Uzbekistan, incorporating 
integrated border management, regional cooperation initiatives 
and security sector reform. 
Finally, the EU should be focusing its efforts more closely on 
where it can make most difference in countering intra-regional 
security threats. The difficult issue of water and environmental 
protection provides a clear opportunity to join up security 
aspirations, the promotion of greater regional cooperation and 
the work begun by the EU Water Initiative, currently being 
coordinated by Italy and the Commission. The EU should learn 
from the successes and failures of previous irrigation projects 
undertaken by Mercy Corps, the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDS) and the UNDP11 , but be unafraid to 
exercise its convening power to help resolve issues fairly by the 
states themselves. It could build in poverty reduction strategies 
and maintain awareness of sensitivities surrounding the use of 
contested territories and the mobilisation of ethnicity by different 
parties to suit their interests. To the EU’s credit it has been able 
to get the five Central Asian republics around the table in the 
Water Initiative, which is an accomplishment in itself.
Overall, for the EU to have a greater impact, it must interweave 
the strands of its security objectives with other aspects of the 
regional strategy, notably those concerning regional cooperation 
and improved governance, and focus on the areas where it can 
make a material difference, rather than areas where dialogue 
occurs but little in the way of action emerges. 
 Conclusion
It is not too late for the EU’s Strategy for Central Asia to have a 
greater impact. The easy route between now and 2013 would 
be to fall back on high-level seminars and dialogues where both 
parties go through the motions, and to fund numerous incoherent 
projects that make little practical difference to Central Asians, 
fail to further the EU’s essential interests and values, and do not 
represent value for money. 
To avoid that fate, the EU must realise that it should operate in a 
lean and direct way, focusing resources on critical issues where it 
might make a difference. The overarching seven priorities of the 
Strategy remain valid but choices need to be on where to back up 
interests with substantial funding. Programming underpinned by 
‘values’ and which links (human) security to development would 
be a way to prioritise funding through technical assistance and 
projects with local and national authorities plus civil society. 
The interests of both Europeans and Central Asians largely 
coincide: economic development and greater security (in Central 
Asians’ case from both internal and external threats) to the 
11  For a critique of these projects, see Christine Bichsel, Conflict 
Transformation in Central Asia: Irrigation Disputes in the Ferghana Valley 
(Routledge: Abingdon), 2009. 
benefit of both. The EU’s Strategy should start from this shared 
standpoint, while recognising the immediate disjuncture between 
perceptions of what constitutes ‘security’. Central Asian political 
elites interpret security principally as regime security, while for 
the EU the term encompasses a human dimension that involves 
the right to free association, worship and impartial rule of law, 
underpinned by good governance. The EU has been content to 
focus its initiatives in areas where the definition can be shared, 
such as on border management and halting the narcotics trade , 
although even this, as noted above, can be distorted by possible 
local political involvement or acquiescence in drug trafficking. 
European representatives should not shy away from addressing 
Central Asia’s security shortcomings, both in terms of human 
security as well as in governance and state security. On the 
other hand it should then be able to offer concrete assistance.
Thus, for a more comprehensive approach to take root, the 
EU must now articulate its objectives by clearly linking the 
different strands of its approach, and focus on the areas where 
it can produce most benefit both to the region’s people and in 
furtherance of its own regional strategy. 
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Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the 
EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge hub on 
broader Europe-Central Asia relations. Specifically, the project aims to:
• Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying specific attention 
to security, development and the promotion of democratic values within the 
context of Central Asia’s position in world politics;
• Enhance knowledge of Europe’s engagement with Central Asia through top-
quality research and by raising awareness among European policy-makers 
and civil society representatives, as well as discuss European policies among 
Central Asian communities;
• Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries 
and Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central 
Asian relations.
Currently, the broader programme is coordinated by FRIDE, in partnership 
with the Karelian Institute and CEPS, with the support of the Open Society 
Institute and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main outputs of the 
project are a series of policy briefs and comprehensive reports on key issues 
facing the Europe-Central Asia relationship. 
Please follow our work on www.eucentralasia.eu. If you have any comments 
or suggestions, please email us at email.eucam@gmail.com 
FRIDE is a European think tank for global action, based in Madrid, which pro-
vides fresh and innovative thinking on Europe’s role on the international stage. 
Our mission is to inform policy and practice in order to ensure that the EU plays 
a more effective role in supporting multilateralism, democratic values, security 
and sustainable development. We seek to engage in rigorous analysis of the 
difficult debates on democracy and human rights, Europe and the international 
system, conflict and security, and development cooperation. FRIDE benefits 
from political independence and the diversity of views and intellectual back-
ground of its international team. 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think tanks operating in the European 
Union today. It aims to carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to so-
lutions to the challenges facing Europe today and to achieve high standards of 
academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. CEPS provides 
a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
Founded in 1971, the Karelian Institute is a unit of the Faculty of Social 
Sciences and Business Studies of the University of Eastern Finland. It en-
gages in basic and applied multi-disciplinary research, supports the super-
vision of postgraduate studies and researcher training, and participates in 
teaching. It focuses mainly on three thematic priorities: Borders and Russia; 
Ethnicity and Culture; and Regional and Rural Studies.    
http://www.uef.fi/ktl/etusivu   
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